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Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort
Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr.t

The reforms in the law that could be made on behalf of the poor comprise a formidable agenda. The general aims of such reforms are to
(1) facilitate lowering the cost of things the poor buy, (2) increase the
income flow to the poor, either in money or in goods and services, and
(3) modify the terms and procedures of exchange so that the poor are
able to buy and sell on more advantageous terms. Most such reforms
would intrude on established preserves and are politically controversial and technically intricate.
The problem of redistributing income or bargaining power in favor
of disadvantaged groups is not new. It is the essence of making and
remaking domestic policy. Conflict-often protracted and heated-is
involved even where the merits of reform seem apparent, where the
number of potential beneficiaries is large in relation to the interests
opposing change, and where the stakes concern a necessary of life.
Illustrative of such elemental conflicts are those concerning the fetters
on selling margarine that had been imposed in favor of the dairy industry,1 and the current controversies over legal restrictions on4 the
3
marketing of shoes, 2 cotton clothing, and prescription drugs.
Legal reforms aimed at such redistributions characteristically are
achieved through the medium of legislation and by the mechanism
t Executive Director, American Bar Foundation, and Professor of Law, University
of Chicago. This paper is one of several emanating from studies done under contract
with the Office of Economic Opportunity, CAP 67-7075, Research Contract No. OEO-4047.
The views stated are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the
Office of Economic Opportunity or the American Bar Foundation, its officers and directors, or others associated with its work.
1 Porter, Oleomargarine-Patternfor State Trade Barriers, 29 S.W. Soc. Scr. Q. 38
(1948). Hearings on Oleomargarine Tax Repeal Before the House Comm. on Agriculture,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Meissner, Consumer Protection or
Butter Politics, 3 Cartel 49 (1952).
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1969, at 17; N.Y. Times, July 13, 1969, at 15.
3 Textile Imports Are a National Problem, 118 TEXTiLE WoRLD 72 (May 1968); Meeting Gavel Down on Imports, 118 TExTIuE WoRaL 78 (Nov. 1968); 115 CONG. REc. S7805
(daily ed. July 10, 1969) (remarks of Sen. Hollings).
4 Hearingson Competitive Problems in Drug Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967-68) [parts
1-13 published to date].
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of political action. The agents of change characteristically have been
private individuals and groups, organized around common grievances
and claims. Illustrations are abundant: the retail grocers and the
7
5
Robinson-Patman Act, the unions and Medicare," farmers and parity,
8
senior citizens and Social Security, the American Legion and veteran's
pensions. 9 Characteristically also, the private groups with direct interest in change seek alliance with others who have indirect, civic, or
humanitarian purposes in mind. Hence, the political roles of such
groups as the League of Women Voters, religious affiliations, and philanthropic organizations.
The legislative-political method of substantive legal reform is formally as accessible to the poor as it is to any other sector of the community. There are no special limits on the franchise to vote or the
freedom to organize that apply to the poor but not to others. But the
practical obstacles to law reform on behalf of the poor are formidable.
For one thing, "the poor" are not a single constituency but many constituencies that are diverse in location, outlook, special need, and social
associations. Moreover, these separate constituencies are generally
speaking unorganized, to some extent politically unsophisticated,

inadequately financed for political warfare, and not patient enough
to persevere in the struggles that legislative reform entails. It is widely
acknowledged that they have been less successful in securing substantive
legal change in their interest than more affluent members of the community.
Awareness of the politically weak position of the poor has stimulated search for alternative courses of reform action. The most obvious legal alternative is the use of litigation, a medium which has
been employed, with varying degrees of emphasis and success, by other
groups that have wanted legal change. 10 This mode of law reform has
become a major component in the policy-and even more so in the
5

F. RowAE,

PRicE DISCRiMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

Acr 3 (1962).

6 Harris, Annals of Legislation: Medicare 42 NEw YORKER 29 (July 2, 1966), 30 (July

9, 1966), 35 (July 16, 1966), 35 (July 23, 1966).
7 0. KIm, THE FARM BUREAU TrmOuGH THREE DEcADEs (1948); C.
F~Am BUaRU AND Ta NEw DEAL (1962).
8 R. LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-1935 (1968); A.

CAMPBELL,

THE

ALTMEYER,

THE

FORMATIV YEARs oF SOCIAL SECURITY (1966).
9 R. JONES, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGION (1946); R. MoLEY, THE ArimuCAN LEGION
STORY (1966); D. CULP, THE A~mucN LEGION: A STUDY IN PRESSURE POLITICS (1942) (un-

published Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago).
10 E.g., Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961); G. WOLFSKELL, THE REVOLT OF THE CONsERVATIvES; A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
LIBERTY LEAGUE, 1934-40 (1962); The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, 47 FORTUNE 137 (June,
1953); Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to Petition, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211 (1967).
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rhetoric-of the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic
Opportunity.
Seeking to reform the law to benefit the poor is surely an appropriate concern of the Legal Services Program. As a practical matter,
it is impossible to disassociate specific legal problems encountered
by individuals who are poor from the social and legal matrix in which
they arise. Directing legal service effort at change in the law's terms
can result in greater "pay-off" than similar effort spent on isolated
cases-effecting improvement, as it were, wholesale rather than retail.
There is also a political and spiritual aspect to such a strategy: Trying
to change the law is a sharing of discontent with the poor's condition
of life as they find it and an expression of hope for the better.
What is not so clear, however, is whether the weight of the Legal
Service Program's law reform effort is most usefully concentrated in
the medium of litigation. The analysis presented here presents the
question whether the law-reform potential of litigation through the
Legal Services Program as presently conceived is not considerably
exaggerated.' The companion question is whether the potential role
of the Legal Services Program in the more conventional mode of law
reform-legislation-has been given adequate attention.'2
I.

LAW REFORM THROUGH THE JUDICIARY

The strategy of seeking law reform through appellate litigation
begins with the observation that courts in fact make and remake law.
There was a time when this was not considered true. It is now generally recognized, however, that the decision of any seriously arguable
legal controversy involves a creative intellectual act. American courts
are so fully aware of the creative aspect of their function 3 that judicial lawmaking is now something in the way of a continuously selffulfilling prophecy. When combined with the fact that American
judges are recruited mostly from those who have had active political
and governmental careers, where making policy is daily work, these
circumstances produce a frankly reformist judicial attitude. So far
as concerns reliance on the past as a guide to enunciation of law in
the present, the courts today are scarcely distinguishable from the
11 See Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YAr LJ. 1317,
1340-4 (1964); Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, 12 PRAC. LAw 13 (1966).
12 See Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-Poverty Program, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 211, 247-8 (1966).
13 See W. SCHAEFER, PRECEDET AND PoLIcY (1956); Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking
in LEGAL INsTrrUTIONs TODAY AND TomoROw I (M. Paulsen ed. 1959); Traynor, The Well.
Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARE. L. REv. 287 (1967).
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legislature. This is especially apparent in light of the fact that both
legislatures and courts oscillate between reform and repose.
The courts have also evolved devices that to some degree approximate the legislature's capacity to time and to mold new law in such
a way as to minimize disruption at the point of enforcement. A new
judicial rule can be forecast, postponed as to its effective date, or announced in principle, subject to later elaboration of detail, 14 fashioned
narrowly or broadly; 15 its wisdom and effect illuminated through such
devices as intervention,' 6 presentations amicus curiae, 17 reargument, 8
and remand for supplemental evidence.' 9 Concepts of standing to sue,
ripeness for adjudication, mootness of controversy, and the "political
question" doctrine have been so reworked that almost any legal contention may now be brought before the courts. 20 Indeed, procedural

objections to appellate lawmaking now more often than not are merely
indirect adverse determinations of the contentions presented. As a
practical matter, therefore, it may presently be easier for a litigant
to get a law reform proposal into court than to get one out of a legislative committee. This is probably most clearly so of a proposal on
behalf of a weak and divided interest, such as that of the poor.
From a substantive point of view, there appear to be a wide range
of opportunities for judicial lawmaking with reference to the problems
14 See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (Mirandarules governing incustody interrogation to be applied only to cases in which the trial began after the date of
the Miranda decision); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(footnote indicating that closer scrutiny might be given to legislation restricting personal
and political rights than to other legislation). Compare Baker v. Garr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (legislative apportionment held subject to judicial review) with Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.. 533 (1964) (legislature must be apportioned substantially on "one man,
one vote" basis).
15 Compare Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 bars
private discrimination on the basis of race in the sale or rental of housing)
with Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (civil rights "sit-in" conviction reversed and
remanded to state court for further consideration where state criminal trespass statute
was repealed subsequent to conviction).
16 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24; Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
386 U.S. 129 (1967).
17 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963), amid curiae argued the case on both
sides, and an amicus curiae brief was filed by twenty-two state governments. In Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), twelve amicus curiae briefs were filed urging reversal and two
urging affirmance.
18 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972 (1953), 374 U.S. 483 (1954), 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
19 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
20 See A. BicKEL, THE ImAsT DANGEROUs BRANCH (1962); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS
6-20, 35-87 (1968); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAiv.
L. REv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HAiv.
L. REv. 255 (1961); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
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of poverty. With important qualifications to be considered presently,
reasonable chances of success have existed for inducing the courts to
rework a formidable variety of legal rules concerning the poor. These
opportunities include:
(1) Elimination of the residency requirement in eligibility for pub21
lic insurance benefits;
22
(2) Equalization of state aid to public educational systems;
(3) Invalidation of restrictions in the political or social freedom
23
of public housing tenants;
(4) Recognition of a tenant's right to withold paying rent on pre24
mises not in compliance with building codes;
(5) Recognition of "overreaching" as a ground for invalidating
a contract;2 5

(6) Elimination of wealth-related impediments to the right to be
heard in adjudicative forums 26 and to participate in the electoral
process.2 7
In more general perspective, whereas the problem of poverty is
essentially that of unequal income distribution, one of the least formally restricted guarantees in the Constitution is the equal protection
clause. Surely the advocate can be found who would be willing to argue
that equal protection is denied under a system of taxation and wealth
transfer that fails to result in substantial equality of income. Most
all other proposals to reform the law for the benefit of the poor would
follow a fortiori.
From the perspective of legal services for the poor, the judicial way
21 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state laws conditioning welfare assistance on one-year state residence held unconstitutional).
22 See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub. nom., McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (rejecting claim that equal protection clause requires apportionment of public school funds solely according to the educational needs of students).
23 See Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (local public
housing authority may not automatically exclude or evict a low-income family on
the sole ground that the head of the family or some other member has an illegitimate
child).
24 See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (lease void
where landlord at time of renting knew of housing code violations rendering premises
unclean, unsafe, and unsanitary).
25 See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc.
2d 620, 279 N.YS.2d 391 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1967) (excessively high price may constitute
unconscionable contractual provision subject to invalidation).
26 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Sanks v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19, Prob. juris. noted, 395 U.S. 974 (1969).
27 Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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to law reform has at least three attractions compared with legislation.
The first is that the courts are open as of right and must at least give
ear to a presentation. The courts of first instance must hear any grievance that can be cast in the form of a legal action, and there are few
that cannot. The right of appeal is substantially untramelled through
the first appellate tier, and is reasonably open beyond that in most
state court systems. Hearing before the Supreme Court of the United
States is more difficult to obtain, but even there the matter is almost
as nearly a matter of priority as one of privilege. In contrast, the legislature-whether federal, state, or municipal---can be a procedural
labyrinth. Moreover, in the important matter of appearances, when a
court rejects a proposal, it ordinarily is expected to give reasons. To
those petitioning for the have-nots, that at least is consolation.
A second attraction of the judicial forum in anti-poverty law reform
is its receptivity to argument based on principle. A judicial forum is
expected to express rules of general application (in this sense, neutral
ones), normative propositions that hold for all cases to which their terms
apply. 28 Specifically, the rules announced by courts are not supposed to
be shaped by considerations of expediency, i.e., cost; a court is supposed
to forswear any social or political program of its own, 29 confining itself
to issues on which there may be division of opinion but the resolution
of which can be rested on some basis other than interest group lines as
such. A forum in which discourse is conducted in arguments over
principle is inevitably predisposed to claims in behalf of the poor, for
all propositions for alleviating poverty involve essentially a competition between an ideal of equity and the problem of cost.
The third attraction of the judicial forum is the relatively insulated
position from which it permits the advocate of legal change to operate.
The advocate in the judicial "test case" has substantially all the privileges of the advocate in the mine-run legal controversy. The advocate's
privilege presupposes that an outcome either way is a matter of no
disturbing significance to the social system. It is one of full voice and
no responsibility for consequences which may ensue if his argument
is heeded. Although the very aim of a test case is to produce significant
consequences through change in the law, the advocate in such a case
nevertheless retains this privilege. He is regarded as a barrister rather
than a lobbyist, his presentation is judged by its merit and not according
28 Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. Rxv. 40 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 1 (1959).
29 See Kurland, Foreword:"Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv. 143 (1964); cf. Cox, Foreword:
ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HIAIv. L. REv. 91
(1966).
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to the interests it may further, and he is not held accountable if the
measures in question prove unworkable or unpopular.
The contrast between the role of judicial advocate for the poor and
a legislative one could hardly be stronger: The former is regarded as
an officer of the court, the-latter something in the way of a political
busybody. It is likely, in any event, that advocates for the poor can
longer hold sway, and have better chances of continuing the appropriations for their agencies, if they concentrate their law-reform effort
in the courts. Putting the proposition less softly, law reform in behalf
of the poor creates fewer immediate ethical and political problems for
its professional partisans when it is pursued in the courts rather than
when it is pursued in the legislature.
II.

LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING

Despite its attractions, a strategy of judicial lawmaking has limitations
that considerably reduce its reform utility. Some of these concern the
efficiency of the judicial process itself, others the effectiveness of the
legislation it can produce.
The most serious limitation on the procedure of judicial lawmaking
is its ephemeral legitimacy. Along any given frontier of the law, the
appellate courts can only temporarily pursue a deliberate policy of
development. As the line of new doctrine extends beyond the implications of prior legal consensus, each advance has less support in general
assent, acknowledgment, and approval. Since courts lack altogether the
means of formal policy ratification provided by the ballot box, each
step of a pioneering course of decision rests to an increasing degree on
its intrinsic merit in the eyes of the public and on the expectation that
it will not be legislatively reversed. A court may for some time continue
to be "right" and to be immune from immediate attack. At some point,
however, a court functioning as though it had political mandate comes
to be evaluated in those terms, and a constitutional crisis is presented.
The Warren Court's encounter is only the most recent.
The courts of course cannot avoid substantial involvement in politically controversial questions, nor in legal choices which are equivalent
to legislation. Their lawmaking function remains politically more
tolerable, however, if the grist of their business is various and the direction of their policy indistinct. As performance of the judicial function
becomes directional the protection accorded disinterestedness erodes.
A law-reform strategy which necessarily involves continual testing of
the limits of this protection would seem to have special dangers in an
era when the virtue of disinterestedness is in perhaps critically short
supply.
HeinOnline -- 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 248 1969-1970
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Among other consequences, this kind of limitation means that judicial lawmaking compared to other processes of policy development is
episodic in form and unfinished in product. Even with use of the
devices mentioned earlier, 30 appellate courts are not well equipped for
devising systematic legal generalization. The differences between the
legislative and judicial processes are many and subtle, but the ones
salient for present purposes are not difficult to identify:
A court must work with the problem substantially as presented by
the parties in respect to facts, ascription of responsibility, and theory
of causation; a legislature has autonomous capacity to formulate the
problem in all these respects.
A court must dispose of the case before it and having done so loses
authority to act further until another germane case presents itself; a
legislature can disregard the instance which excited its initial attention
and can establish its own agenda for consideration of the problem type.
A court must tender its result and rationale as an accomplished fact,
receiving commentary after the event; a legislature can present its
result and rationale in proposal form for consideration and modification
before official adoption.
Courts can extend a political principle more readily than they can
initiate one, fill gaps but not build structures. In the law relating to
the poor, the courts can enlarge eligibility at the margin of benefit
schemes created by the legislature, such as public education or general
assistance, but they cannot create the schemes in the first place. The
courts can enforce building codes but they cannot write them. They can
impose liability for fraud but cannot transform a vendor into a public
utility. The difference is not one of will or effort but of institutional
technique. Holmes summed up these propositions by saying that, in the
main, courts operate in molecular dimensions rather than molar ones.31
Legislatures also have instruments that courts lack entirely. One is
the authority to raise money. A court does not have a Ways and Means
Committee. The inability to command money resources puts severe
and insuperable limits on the potential scope of judicial law reform in
behalf of the poor, whose central problems, after all, concern money. A
closely related resource is the authority to create, empower, and deploy
bureaucracies to get jobs done. Some of the problems of the poor can
be solved by legal changes that are self-executing, but these are exceptional. The most important tasks require manpower: education requires
teachers, jobs require recruiters and trainers, housing requires builders.
30 See notes 14-19, supra.
31 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J. dissenting); cf.
Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LGAL INsrrTiONS TODAY AND TOMoRRow (M.

Paulsen ed. 1959).
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Another means which the legislature possesses but the judiciary lacks
is that of stimulating and sustaining political support for measures that
cost money or involve social dislocation. Legislators can hold hearings,
make speeches, disseminate handouts, and speak to the Kiwanis. Judges,
on the other hand, can speak ex cathedraonly through written opinions;
their unofficial addresses by tradition are confined to subjects other than
those before their courts, and are ordinarily given before a bar association or at commencement exercises. No press conferences, no committee
hearings, no stump speeches, no Face the Nation.
Without the instruments of modern political communication, community support cannot be cultivated for policy and program, and for
it expression in law. No domestic policies and programs require more
pervasive cultivation of support than those designed to benefit the
have-nots, especially because so many of the have-nots are black. The
procedure of judicial lawmaking includes no arrangements for assuring
that its product has the direct sanction of general consent. Without such
support, the Rule of Law in the short run assumes an autocratic connotation and in the long run invites subversion.
III.

DLEMMAS OF A LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

In the light of the limitations on what courts can do in law reform, the legislative course would seem obviously preferable for achieving law reform on behalf of the poor that is structural rather than
symptomological, general in its effect rather than "show case." Economy
in resource allocation within the law-reform effort would point to the
same conclusion. Put bluntly, a law-reform strategy based on judicial
action appears destined to yield relatively inconsequential results at
relatively high political cost. The fairness of "kick out" procedure in
inner !city schools seems inconsequential compared with the "drop out"
problem; 32 the fairness of welfare eligibility rules seems inconsequential
compared with the problem of welfare livelihood;8 3 the problem of
housing codes is nothing to that of the housing shortage;3 4 and so on. It
32 Compare Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc.2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (New
York Education Law does not permit suspension of public high school student for having
been criminally charged with possession of narcotics) with NATIONAL CoMTrrrE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, SOCIAL DYNAMITE: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON UNEMPLOYED, OUT-OFSCHOOL YOUTH IN URBAN AREAs 15 (1961) (Labor Department predicted that in 19 60's more
than 7V million youngsters would drop out before high school graduation).
33 Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state laws conditioning welfare
assistance on one-year state residence held unconstitutional) with R. ELMAN, THE POORHOUSE STATE: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE ON PUBLIC ASSISTANcE (1966).
34 Compare Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (lease void
where landlord at time of renting knew of housing code violations rendering premises
unclean, unsafe and unsanitary) with N.Y. Times, March 16, 1969, at 1 (economists see it
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is not that these smaller problems should be ignored, or that a Legal
Services Program should not seek their solution. The point is that they
are relatively unimportant when the legal structure affecting the poor
is viewed as a whole.
Why, then, the inattention to legislative law reform in the Legal
Services Program? There seem to be two principal reasons: The style
and self-image created in the Legal Services Program is discordant with
an approach to social change that tends to succeed in the legislative
process; and, a legislative reform strategy raises questions of politics
and political ethics for the Legal Services Program that can be temporarily effaced or postponed in a judicial law-reform strategy.
The Legal Services Program's self concept is one of aggressive advocacy. The aggressiveness is expressed in the rhetoric of the program, in
the continuous efforts to differentiate the new Legal Services from the
old legal aid, in the recruitment of young, activist professional staffs,
and in the program's strategic concept of the importance of institutional
change in the alleviation of poverty. The role of advocate is expressed
in the idea that the programhas a client-the poor as a class-to which
is owed the duty of single-minded loyalty and service as defined in the
lawyer-client relationship. The function of the program is to speakpropose, exhort, argue--on behalf of a particular social constituency,
imprecisely defined but sharply conceived as the economically destitute.
This style is appropriate in the representation of individual clients
and, in qualified form, perhaps also in law reform through judicial lawmaking. It is quite inappropriate, generally speaking, in the legislative
process.
Legislation is coalition work. Large majorities rather than bare
majorities are required; appeal must be made to disparate interests on
considerations less often of general principle than of parochial predisposition and prejudice; reciprocity is required through log-rolling or
in the less obtrusive form of compensatory accommodations. Success
in legislative advocacy requires long memory and personal sensitivity as
much as intellectual acuity and rhetorical power. It requires endless
patience, indirection in purpose, and protean adaptability. It requires
finding of common interest among groups that have previously failed
to recognize their common interest, rather than dramatic articulation of
particularist minority claims. It requires acknowledgment of the present
legitimacy of the status quo rather than attacks on its integrity. It is
simply not a job for latter-day Darrows; an act of fantasy is required to
see the idealized Legal Service Program lawyer-young, principled,
as virtually impossible to meet the Housing Act goal of 26 million new or rehabilitated
housing units in the next decade).
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intrepid, and in a hurry-teasing a complicated statutory package
through the legislative convolution.
The root of the style problem may well be simple. It is perhaps
practically impossible over time to have a litigation-oriented legal services agency and a legislative law-reform agency under one roof. A
litigation-oriented agency has to have direct client contact. These days
the maintaining of client credibility, in the current phrase, requires
presentation of the agency as assertive, uncompromising, and quickacting. For it to seek accomodation with divergent or hostile interests
is to run the risk of being perceived as selling out; fabian tactics run
the risk of being considered as indifference, long range solutions as
delay. But surely it is possible to conceive of separate operating units
for legislative law reform-units staffed and operated with an eye to
the legislative process's time dimension, forms of discourse, and mode
of decision.
It is not clear why the administration of the Legal Services Program
has not invested more heavily than it has in creating and sustaining
legislatively-oriented law reform units. It is now five years after the
creation of the Program. A like number of years have passed since
recognition of the saliency in the poverty problem of education,
markets, jobs, and housing. Yet technically precise and programmatically coherent drafts of statutes on most facets of these subjects remain
to be written. 5 The explanation may be persisting faith in the comparative efficacy of judicial law reform, lack of an appealing model (as
the private law office is the model for litigation-oriented legal service),
or simple inattention. It may also be attributable to more or less unconscious recognition of the political implications of making law reform
an objective of the Legal Services Program.
A law-reform strategy has political implications of two different
magnitudes. Both are involved whether the law-reform technique is
judicial or legislative, but they are more obvious in a legislative strategy.
One implication concerns choices to be made within a legal assistance
program as to who shall receive the services of the program. This is
essentially a question of how to deploy the agency's resources. The other
question is whether any governmentally funded agency can long enjoy
support if its program consists of lobbying for an interest group. In
practical
this is essentially a question of agency survival.
At any terms,
given magnitude of legal services resources, to
pursue law
reform is to forego providing other legal services of equivalent cost.
35 See,

e.g., AMERICAN

BAR FOUNDATION,

MODEL RESIDENTIAL

LANDLORD-TENANT

CODE

(Tent. Draft, 1969); NATIONAL- CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Final Draft, 1968).
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Since the demand for front-line legal assistance has proved highly
elastic at present service levels, diversion of resources to law reform
involves making a choice between two groups of potential beneficiaries
of legal service, those who require "first aid" and those who would
ultimately benefit from law reform, judicial or legislative. The choice
is a political one in the sense that it is based on a calculation of relative
social expediency of one expenditure of effort compared to another.
Making such a choice between clients is not contemplated in the
ethics and conventions defining the lawyer's role, certainly not in those
defining the advocate's role. According to the canons and traditions, the
lawyer's selection of clients is governed only by such considerations as
who has first sought the lawyer, who is willing to pay more, and whose
cause the lawyer finds more professionally interesting. None of these
are illuminating or even relevant to the problem of allocating legal
service resources as between legal "first aid" and law reform. The
same kind of problem arises concerning the direction in which law
reform efforts should be aimed. There is no unanimity as to which
laws most need changing, nor as to the kinds of change they ought to
undergo. In providing legal service to paying clients, the lawyer does
not make this decision; the client does so, according to his estimateinformed by the lawyer-as to the cost and prospective benefit of doing
so. In a publicly funded legal assistance program, however, the legal
service agency decides the question by deciding which causes to promote.
In this perspective, there is no difference in principle or political
reality between adjudicative and legislative law reform. There is a
difference, to be sure, in visibility and responsibility. A law office conducting test-case litigation is not ostensibly a federal agency constituted
to reform local law and government. Yet the disguise is not very convincing, and never was to such political realists as Mayor Daley of
Chicago and Governor Reagan of California.3 6 The question in testcase litigation, as in legislative law reform, boils down to the propriety
of constituting a publicly funded agency to lobby for the special
benefit of a limited sector of the general community.
Such instrumentalities are not unprecedented. Many governmental
36 There was a protracted and barely muffled controversy as to whether the Chicago
legal service agencies funded by the OEO should be authorized to sue agencies of state
and city government. The Legal Services Program insisted that such authority should not
be withheld. The formal resolution of the controversy was never very clear, though in the
course of events legal aid litigation against state and city agencies in Chicago has proved
rare. The controversy in California concerned gubernatorial approval of refunding of
the California Rural Legal Agency Assistance, Inc. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1967, at 61;
cf. Note, Neighborhood Law Offices, 80 HARV. L. REy. 805 (1967).
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agencies are in some degree legislative advocates for the private interests with which they are associated. Tax deduction of business's costs
of legislative advocacy has long acquiescence if not approval.3 7 Consumer counsel agencies at the state and federal level have constituencies
that are not really universal. 8 And states have given preferential subsidy
to political parties by means of legislation requiring hourly workers to
be compensated for time to go to the polls. 3 9 There is nevertheless a
serious if simple question of principle involved, namely, whether
government predicated on equal participation of all members of the
electorate is compatible with providing some of them with special
political equipage at public expense.
The instances cited above in which some such equipage has been
provided were not results of considered design. The friendly posture
of some government agencies to their private subjects of regulation is
a failing of political purpose, lamentable and correctable even while
being a persistent tendency. The theory at any rate of business tax
deduction of legislative advocacy costs is derived from the idea that
a business's legal expenses, like its other operating expenses, are deductible. Similarly, the suppositions are that everyone has a consumer's
interest and that reimbursement of voting time for hourly wage employees simply puts them on equal footing with salaried workers and
proprietors. Realism requires recognition that these justifications are
not entirely convincing, that they are not clearly fulfilled in practice,
and that there is ambivalence in objecting on principle to creating a
government lobby for the poor when everyone else already seems to
have one.
The fact remains that in a constitutional regime partisan political
activity is "supposed to be a matter of private initiative. For such a
regime to survive it has to stay pretty much that way in fact. However
inconstantly the principle is fulfilled, it rests on a recognition that a
government which creates agencies to formulate what shall be taken
as the people's will is no longer a government by the people. The force
of the point is suggested by asking what would be the consequences of
generalizing the proposition that the poor should have lobbyists paid
by the government: Should similar lobbyists be provided the near-poor,
the middle-class, the affluent? How does one rationally allocate the
37 Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying, Defining and Attaining the Public Policy Objectives, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (1968); Weaver, Taxes and Lobbying-The Issue Resolved, 31 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 938 (1968).
38 Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 395 (1966).
89 Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), noted in 1952 U. IL. L.F. 442.
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political resources through which resource allocation is made? One
comes uneasily to the conclusion that the idea simply does not have
sustaining attraction.
The conclusion also suggests itself that the idea of "lobbyists for
the poor" is both precious and irrelevant. It seems to be an attempt to
create a role for middle-class professionals in which they can aid the
cause of the poor without losing their professional status or otherwise
getting their hands dirty. It seems irrelevant because it places legal
action and political action in the wrong sequence. Legal steps toward
law reform are taken when political imperatives are strong enough to
require them. Political imperatives are the result of political organization and political pressure.
If the interest groups that comprise the poor do not organize their
own political action, law reform on their behalf is almost certainly
destined to be halting and fragmentary. If they do organize their own
political action, it is hard to see why they will select self-constituted
lobbyists for the poor as their advocates. More probably, as everyone
else does, they will choose advocates when the time comes and according
to who can do the best job, not who most wants to do the job. Probably,
too, the selection will be of rough and ready bargainers rather than
academically groomed professional technicians.
What the interest groups among the poor will need from the professional technicians are specific reform proposals that can be sold.
Reform proposals meeting the test of the political market place must
be related to some general principle of fairness or justice, respond to
interests broad enough to command the necessary votes, and represent
a coherent piece of work from a technical point of view.
The task of drafting law-reform proposals that meet these tests is
exacting, time-consuming, and expensive. Drafting such proposals is
the vocation of agencies whose endeavors have been regarded as standing on- the legitimate side of the line between legal policy analysis
and lobbying, for example, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws, the American Law Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Legislative Drafting Service of Columbia Law School, the law
revision commissions of several states, and an unending series of ad hoc
commissions at every level of government. Just why this approach to
law reform has not been seriously pursued through the Legal Services
Program is not clear.
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